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AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 
The Clean Air Act allows the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) to 
promulgate national ambient air quality standards.  See 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b).  Each state 
is responsible for meeting these standards, id. § 7410(a), and may petition the EPA if 
emissions sources from neighboring states are interfering with compliance, id. § 7426(b).  
The EPA resolves the petition through notice-and-comment rulemaking, issuing a 
proposed rule, accepting comments from the public, holding a public hearing, and 
publishing a final rule.  See id. § 7607(d)(2)-(7).  If the EPA agrees with the petition, it 
may order the emissions source to cease operating within three months.  Id. § 7426(c)(2).  
Alternatively, it may allow the source to continue operating in line with emissions 
limitations and compliance schedules.  See id. 
With this backdrop, on December 5, 2016, the State of Delaware submitted a 
petition to the EPA.  It asked the latter to find that emissions from the Conemaugh 
Generating Station in Pennsylvania impeded its ability to meet ambient air quality 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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standards in 2008 and 2015.1  Per the statutory scheme, the EPA was required to issue a 
final rule on the petition within 60 days—i.e., by February 3, 2017.  Id. § 7426(b).  On 
January 23, 2017, however, it granted itself a six-month extension that postponed the 
deadline to August 3, 2017.  See 82 Fed. Reg. 7,695 (Jan. 23, 2017); see also 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7607(d)(10) (authorizing a six-month extension of certain deadlines).  
Delaware asks us to review the EPA’s extension.  It contends the EPA had no 
authority to lengthen the deadline for acting on its petition.  The EPA counters that we 
have no jurisdiction over Delaware’s claim, as it became moot when the extension 
expired.  It also argues the extension is not final agency action fit for judicial review by 
our Court.   
While Delaware’s claim was pending, the EPA issued a proposed rule denying the 
petition.  Because it has yet to publish a final rule, we address its jurisdictional 
arguments.  For the reasons stated below, we do not agree that the claim is moot.  
However, we conclude that the EPA’s extension is not final agency action.  Accordingly, 
we dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. 
I. Mootness 
 
The EPA argues Delaware’s claim is moot because the extension expired on 
August 4, 2017.  In the EPA’s view, an order vacating the extension would provide no 
relief, as no live case or controversy remains.  Delaware responds that the EPA 
                                              
1 Delaware’s petition addresses ambient air quality standards for ozone in 2008 
and 2015.  In November 2017, the EPA “issued a determination” that Delaware “timely 
attained the 2008 ozone [standards].”  EPA Br. at 10 n.4.  Because the EPA has yet to 
make the same finding as to the 2015 standards, its decision has no effect on the petition.   
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misconstrues the type of relief it seeks.  Instead of asking us to vacate the order, 
Delaware tells us it seeks a ruling that the EPA lacked statutory authority to grant itself a 
six-month extension.   
 “The doctrine of mootness requires that ‘an actual controversy must be extant at 
all stages of review, not merely at the time the complaint is filed.’”  N.J. Tpk. Auth. v. 
Jersey Cent. Power & Light, 772 F.2d 25, 31 (3d Cir. 1985) (quoting Steffel v. Thompson, 
415 U.S. 452, 459 n.10 (1974)).  “The party asserting mootness bears a heavy burden to 
show the case is moot.”  Seneca Res. Corp. v. Twp. of Highland, 863 F.3d 245, 254 (3d 
Cir. 2017).  If that is met, “the burden [then] shifts to the party opposing mootness to 
explain why the case is not moot.”  Id. 
“Our impotence ‘to review moot cases . . . derives from the requirement of Article 
III of the Constitution under which the exercise of our judicial power depends upon the 
existence of a case or controversy.’”  Jersey Cent. Power & Light, 772 F.2d at 31 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246 
(1971) (per curiam)).  Thus “[a] case may become moot if (1) the alleged violation has 
ceased, and there is no reasonable expectation that it will recur, and (2) interim relief or 
events have completely and irrevocably eradicated the effects of the alleged violation.”  
Finberg v. Sullivan, 658 F.2d 93, 97-98 (3d Cir. 1980) (en banc) (footnote omitted) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).   
 In line with these principles, “a matter is not necessarily moot simply because the 
order attacked has expired.”  Jersey Cent. Power & Light, 772 F.2d at 31 (emphasis 
added).  “[I]f the underlying dispute between the parties is one ‘capable [of] repetition, 
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yet evading review’ [as an exception to mootness], it remains a justiciable controversy 
within the meaning of Article III.”  Id.  This exception “applies only . . . where (1) ‘the 
challenged action [is] in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to cessation or 
expiration,’ and (2) ‘there [is] a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party 
[will] be subject to the same action again.’”  Kingdomware Techs., Inc. v. United States, 
136 S. Ct. 1969, 1976 (2016) (second, third, and fourth alterations in original) (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 17 (1998)).   
Here Delaware has satisfied both prongs of the exception.  First, the extension—
lasting only six months in duration—is too short to be fully litigated before its expiry and 
thus evades review.  See Del Monte Fresh Produce Co. v. United States, 570 F.3d 316, 
322 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“This court has held that agency actions of less than two years’ 
duration cannot be ‘fully litigated’ prior to cessation or expiration. . . .”).  Second, there is 
a reasonable expectation that Delaware will have to contend with another six-month 
extension.  The record demonstrates that Delaware has filed several petitions in the past 
and that the EPA has granted itself a six-month extension on at least three prior petitions.  
Moreover, given its ongoing need to meet national ambient air quality standards, 
Delaware will likely file more petitions with the EPA.  Cf. id. at 325-26 (“[S]uch delays 
[are] likely to recur in the future.  [Appellant] has encountered a series of substantially 
similar injuries from delays of substantially similar license applications in the past, and 
given its business plan it anticipates suffering similar injuries in the future.”).  Hence the 
underlying dispute falls within the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception 
to mootness.  See Jersey Cent. Power & Light, 772 F.2d at 31.    
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The EPA counters that Delaware’s claim does not evade review because Delaware 
could have resolved its claim before the extension expired by seeking expedited briefing 
and argument in our Court.  This contention, however, misapprehends controlling 
precedent.  “By [‘evading review,’] the Supreme Court has meant evading Supreme 
Court review.”  Christian Knights of Ku Klux Klan Invisible Empire, Inc. v. District of 
Columbia, 972 F.2d 365, 369 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (emphasis added).  As such, Delaware’s 
failure to request expedited review in our Court carries no weight in our analysis.    
Accordingly, we decline to dismiss Delaware’s claim on mootness grounds.  
II. Finality 
 
 The EPA also contends its extension is not final agency action because it is 
interlocutory and procedural.  Delaware responds that the extension is final because it 
defers the EPA’s performance of a non-discretionary duty—issuing a final rule on its 
petition within a sixty-day time frame.  
 We review de novo whether the extension is final agency action.  See Minard Run 
Oil Co. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 670 F.3d 236, 247 (3d Cir. 2011).  “As a general matter, two 
conditions must be satisfied for agency action to be ‘final’: First, [it] . . . must mark the 
‘consummation’ of the agency’s decisionmaking process . . . —it must not be of a merely 
tentative or interlocutory nature.”  Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177-78 (1997) 
(internal citation omitted) (quoting Chi. & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 
U.S. 103, 113 (1948)).  “And second, [it] . . . must be one by which ‘rights or obligations 
have been determined,’ or from which ‘legal consequences will flow. . . .’”  Id. at 178 
(quoting Port of Bos. Marine Terminal Ass’n v. Rederiaktiebolaget Transatl., 400 U.S. 
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62, 71 (1970)).  These conditions are analogous—but not identical—to additional factors 
our court considers in deciding whether an agency’s decision is final: 
1) whether the decision represents the agency’s definitive position on the 
question; 2) whether the decision has the status of law with the expectation 
of immediate compliance; 3) whether the decision has immediate impact on 
the day-to-day operations of the party seeking review; 4) whether the 
decision involves a pure question of law that does not require further 
factual development; and 5) whether immediate judicial review would 
speed enforcement of the relevant act. 
 
Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of N.J. v. Corrigan, 347 F.3d 57, 69 n.7 (3d Cir. 2003) 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting CEC Energy Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 891 
F.2d 1107, 1110 (3d Cir. 1989)).  Here, regardless whether we follow Bennett or 
Corrigan, the result is the same.  The extension is not final agency action, and thus we 
lack jurisdiction to review it.   
We start our analysis with Bennett.  The extension does not meet its test for 
finality because it does not “mark the ‘consummation’ of the [EPA’s] decisionmaking 
process,” Bennett, 520 U.S. at 178, or “alter[] the status quo,” Impro Prods., Inc. v. Block, 
722 F.2d 845, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1983).  Instead, it “merely begins a process” that concludes 
with a final rule addressing Delaware’s petition.  Clean Air Council v. Pruitt, 862 F.3d 1, 
6 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (per curiam).  Moreover, if we were to intervene now, we would 
subject the EPA to “judicial interference [before] an administrative decision has been 
formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way.”  Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 
148 (1967).  As such, both prongs of Bennett indicate that we lack jurisdiction to review 
the extension at this point in the rulemaking process.  
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Moving on to Corrigan, the extension also fails to qualify as final agency action 
because it does not represent the EPA’s definitive position on the petition and it does not 
announce any new regulations that require immediate compliance.  While the EPA’s 
delay affects Delaware’s ability to address certain sources of pollution in a timely 
manner, it remains free to challenge the extension by filing suit in district court.  See 42 
U.S.C. § 7604(a)(3) (“The district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction to 
compel . . . agency action unreasonably delayed.”); cf. Toilet Goods Ass’n v. Gardner, 
387 U.S. 158, 165 (1967) (“[A] refusal to admit an inspector . . . would at most lead only 
to a suspension of certification services . . . , a determination that can then be promptly 
challenged. . . .”).  We recognize that Delaware’s claim involves a pure question of law.  
However, we are unable to expedite the EPA’s rulemaking process, as district courts have 
exclusive jurisdiction over actions contesting agency delay.  See Sierra Club v. EPA, No. 
01-1008, 2001 WL 476186, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 20, 2001) (per curiam) (“To the extent 
petitioner is concerned about unreasonable delay, or failure to meet a nondiscretionary 
deadline, any relief that may be available to it is by way of an action in district court.  
See 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a).”).  Accordingly, a majority of the Corrigan factors suggest that 
the extension is not a final agency decision. 
 Though both Bennett and Corrigan tell us we lack jurisdiction, Delaware 
contends the statute requires us to review the extension.  Specifically, it points to 
§ 7607(b)(2), which allows the courts of appeals to review “a[ny] final decision by the 
[EPA] Administrator [that] defers performance of any nondiscretionary statutory action 
to a later time.”  42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(2).  By its plain terms, however, this provision 
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applies to a “final decision.”  Id. (emphasis added).  Because the EPA’s extension is not 
final under either our precedent or Supreme Court precedent, § 7607(b)(2) does not 
obligate us to reach the merits of Delaware’s claim.2   
Delaware also argues we must vacate the EPA’s extension before it can ask the 
District Court to compel agency action under § 7604(a).  We disagree.  The Clean Air 
Act does not require our Court to act before a district court issues a ruling under 
§ 7604(a).  See Connecticut v. Pruitt, 3:17cv796 (WWE), 2018 WL 745953, at *1 (D. 
Conn. Feb. 7, 2018) (ruling on a suit under § 7604(a) without requiring the plaintiff to 
obtain vacatur of the extension).  Hence the District Court is free to compel the EPA to 
act on Delaware’s petition even when the extension is still in place, and we need not 
review the EPA’s non-final decision for Delaware to obtain the relief it seeks.  
* * * * * 
 
In sum, we hold that Delaware’s claim is not moot, as it is capable of repetition yet 
evades review.  However, its claim does not challenge final agency action because the 
                                              
2 Additionally, the statute characterizes extensions under § 7607(d)(10) as 
“procedural determinations.”  42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(8).  It states that we may review them 
only “at the time of the substantive review of the rule.”  Id.  Thus, if we look at the statute 
as a whole, it seems unlikely that § 7607(b)(2) would penalize extensions taken under 
§ 7607(d)(10).  See LaVallee Northside Civic Ass’n v. V.I. Coastal Zone Mgmt. Comm’n, 
866 F.2d 616, 621 (3d Cir. 1989) (“[A] recognized tenet of statutory interpretation directs 
that a specific provision in an enactment prevails over a seemingly irreconcilable general 
one.”); see also Portland Cement Ass’n v. EPA, 665 F.3d 177, 193 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (per 
curiam) (“This court has never considered an agency decision to continue the rulemaking 
process to be a ‘final agency action,’ nor has any court held that we have jurisdiction to 
review such a decision under [§] 7607(b)(2).”).   
10 
 
extension is an interlocutory step in the EPA’s rulemaking process.3  Thus we dismiss for 
lack of jurisdiction.  
 
                                              
3 Even though we decline to reach the merits of Delaware’s claim at this stage of 
the rulemaking process, today’s decision does not bar Delaware from renewing its 
challenge when the EPA issues a final rule.  As noted, we are unable to reinstate a 
deadline or compel agency action when Delaware renews its challenge.  However, we 
may address whether the EPA acted in excess of its statutory authority by issuing itself a 
six-month extension.  Our review will depend on whether our Court is the proper venue 
for any subsequent challenges.  See 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (looking to the reach of the 
final rule to determine the proper venue).   
